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MaŶagiŶg a ͚people ďusiŶess͛ iŶ tiŵes of uŶĐertaiŶty: HuŵaŶ resourĐes iŶ OĐeaŶ 
TraŶsport & TradiŶg͛s strategy iŶ the ϭ97Ϭs 
1.  Introduction
1
 
OĐeaŶ, estaďlished iŶ ϭϴϲϱ, ǁas ͚oŶe of BƌitaiŶ͛s aŶd the ǁoƌld͛s leadiŶg liŶes of Đaƌgo ǀessels.͛2 
While there were larger shipping companies in terms of tonnage (see table 1), these were active in 
the taŶkeƌ aŶd ďulk tƌades ǁhiĐh used ǀeƌǇ laƌge ships; OĐeaŶ ǁas the UK͛s ŵost iŵpoƌtaŶt 
operator in the prestigious sector of general cargo liners carrying the most valuable items and 
running to a strict schedule. The company pioneered and then dominated cargo shipping from 
Liverpool to East Asia for over a century and was at the forefront of containerisation which 
revolutionised sea transport from the 1960s. During the 1970s, a period of structural change and 
global recession, Ocean went through a strategic reorientation, the pace and direction of which 
seem to have been influenced significantly by human resources considerations. This article will 
draw on board-level minutes and strategy documents to highlight the ways in which human 
resources were perceived as of critical importance to the company and how managing staff 
numbers and staff morale played a key role in strategic decisions.
3
  
2. The industry, the company, and human resources 
OĐeaŶ͛s histoƌǇ Ŷeeds to ďe uŶdeƌstood iŶ the ĐoŶteǆt of that of Bƌitish aŶd ǁoƌld shippiŶg iŶ the 
postwar era. During the long boom from the late 1940s to the early 1970s, shipping grew along 
with world trade, driven by the hunger of the European, American and Asian economies for 
imported raw materials and oil and by the increasing international exchange of manufactured 
goods.
4
 Changes within the shipping industry underpinned the expansion of the global economy, 
with technological and institutional innovations making transport cheaper and more efficient.
5
 The 
 2 
ďulk tƌades paǀed the ǁaǇ ǁith the deǀelopŵeŶt of ͚supeƌtaŶkeƌs͛ aŶd laƌge ďulk Đaƌƌieƌs fƌoŵ the 
1950s onwards, along with large-scale shore installations that permitted the speedy loading and 
unloading of bulk cargoes. Increasingly, these ships operated from the deregulated environment 
of the so-Đalled ͚flag of ĐoŶǀeŶieŶĐe͛ states. IŶ OĐeaŶ͛s ďusiŶess of liŶeƌ shippiŶg, suĐh 
rationalisation was impossible as long as cargoes arrived in port in myriad shapes and sizes and 
had to be expertly stowed by hand by increasingly well-paid, and increasingly fractious, dock 
workers. Only with the introduction of container ships which could be loaded and unloaded 
quickly using specialised equipment was rationalisation possible in the liner trades.
6
  
Afteƌ the ϭϵϳϯ ͚oil shoĐk͛, the shippiŶg iŶdustƌǇ fell iŶto deep aŶd pƌoloŶged depƌessioŶ as laƌge 
numbers of ships built to serve a seemingly ever expanding world trade were chasing a limited 
amount of cargo. All major sectors of shipping – tankers, bulk and liners – were hit during the 
Ǉeaƌs of ͚stagflatioŶ͛ ǁheŶ output aŶd tƌade ǁeƌe depƌessed, deŵaŶd foƌ ƌaǁ ŵateƌials fell, 
economies grew more energy efficient and oil sources closer to the places of consumption were 
exploited. The shipping crisis of the 1970s and 1980s spelt the end for the merchant fleets of most 
of the ͚TƌaditioŶal Maƌitiŵe NatioŶs͛, the pƌiŵaƌilǇ WesteƌŶ EuƌopeaŶ ĐouŶtƌies ;plus JapaŶ aŶd 
the United States) that dominated mercantile shipping in the 19
th
 to mid-20
th
 centuries. Low-cost 
shipping both in developing countries, particularly in Asia, and in flag-of-convenience states such 
as Panama and Liberia, expanded at the expense of high-cost providers in the developed world. 
Thus, the shipping industry went through a period of disruptive change in the 1960s and 1970s. It 
experienced technological change, increased competition, intensified global interaction, pressure 
on companies in the industrialised countries to adapt and threats to established patterns of work 
and employment. Far from unique in this regard, the shipping industry can be regarded as one 
example of an industry contributing to enhanced globalisation, while at the same time 
experiencing its effects.
7
  
 3 
The British fleet, along with that of Norway, was the worst affected by the shipping crisis. From a 
British perspective, the history of postwar shipping is one of at first relative and then absolute 
decline (see table 2).
8
 Expansion in the early postwar years was followed by a period of 
complacency and disappointing profits. In the 1960s, British shipping companies began to 
modernise and expand their fleets, helped by generous government support.
9
 Liner companies 
such as Ocean and P&O diversified into the booming bulk and tanker sectors, as well as pioneering 
the new container business. The UK-registered merchant fleet remained the largest in the world 
uŶtil ϭϵϲϳ ǁheŶ it ǁas oǀeƌtakeŶ ďǇ that of Liďeƌia, a ͚flag of ĐoŶǀeŶieŶĐe͛ ŵostlǇ used ďǇ Gƌeek 
and American controlled tankers. From the mid-1970s, the UK fleet shrank rapidly as established 
shipping companies either went out of business or abandoned shipping for other activities.  
There has been nearly as much debate about the reasons for this decline as about those for the 
UK͛s oǀeƌall eĐoŶoŵiĐ uŶdeƌpeƌfoƌŵaŶĐe iŶ the postǁaƌ eƌa. “hipoǁŶeƌs highlighted uŶfaiƌ 
ĐoŵpetitioŶ fƌoŵ ͚flags of ĐoŶǀeŶieŶĐe͛, suďsidised deǀelopiŶg ĐouŶtƌǇ ships aŶd state-owned 
Eastern bloc shipping lines. They also protested against wide-spƌead ͚flag disĐƌiŵiŶatioŶ͛, the 
restrictions placed on foreign-flag shipping by the United States and many developing countries. 
The comparatively high cost of unskilled labour in the UK was mentioned as well.
10
 There also 
were a number of structural factors weighing particularly heavily on British shipping: 
Decolonisation led to the loss of protected imperial markets and took place in the context of a 
general rebalancing of UK trade towards nearby Europe. British imports and exports were 
depressed by the general weakness of the British economy. Nonetheless, some authors blame the 
British shipping industry itself, accusing it of managerial failings and a lack of entrepreneurial 
spirit.
11
 In this view, British shipowners failed to invest when shipping volumes were expanding in 
the early postwar years, only invested in tankers and large bulk carriers when the boom in these 
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sectors was almost exhausted, were long complacent about their abysmally low profitability, and 
in general did not behave very much like profit-seeking entrepreneurs.  
In this context, the story of Ocean has both typical and individual elements. The company had 
experienced a period of complacency after the War and even though its return on capital was 
double the average in shipping, it was disappointing when compared to other industries.
12
 Ocean 
had developed a well justified pride in its long history of successful operations, in the quality of its 
service and its ability to run its fleet efficiently and with hardly any accidents or downtime. Ocean 
officers and managers were proud (to the point of arrogance, in the view of colleagues in other 
fiƌŵsͿ of theiƌ ƌeĐoƌd aŶd the ͚OĐeaŶ ǁaǇ͛ of doiŶg thiŶgs.13 Ocean, along with P&O, was among 
the first European shipping firms to realise both the potential of containers and the threat they 
posed to traditional liner shipping. In 1965, Ocean, P&O, British & Commonwealth and Furness 
Withy formed a consortium, Overseas Container Lines (OCL), to invest heavily into the 
containerisation of their Australian and Far Eastern trades. It was obvious that one large container 
ship would replace several conventional liners (figures between five and nine are usually cited), 
not only because it was much larger but also because it would spend one or two days rather than 
tǁo oƌ ŵoƌe ǁeeks iŶ poƌt. While pioŶeeƌiŶg the Ŷeǁ foƌŵ of geŶeƌal Đaƌgo shippiŶg, OĐeaŶ͛s 
managers were fully aware that their traditional general cargo liner business, along with the ships 
and seafarers employed in it, would become redundant as a result.
14
 Nonetheless, 
containerisation seemed inevitable as liner shipping was suffering from poor returns because of 
ever higher costs and ever longer delays suffered in clogged-up ports.
15
  
1965 (the 100
th
 anniversary of the company) was a crucial year for Ocean. The company expanded 
through the acquisition of Liner Holdings, initiated the launch of Overseas Container Lines and 
listed on the stock market. Plans for diversification, both within shipping and into land-based 
service industries, were developed. In 1967 and 1972, Ocean went through two rounds of 
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ƌestƌuĐtuƌiŶg ǁhiĐh ƌefleĐted ďoth OĐeaŶ͛s speĐifiĐ situatioŶ aŶd the iŶflueŶĐe of ŵaŶageŵeŶt 
concepts developed at US business schools.
16
 Like many other firms at the time, Ocean turned to 
outside consultants and sent promising young managers on MBA courses.
17
 Nicholas Barber, who 
joined Ocean in 1964 and later rose to the position of CEO, took an 18-month MBA course at 
Columbia University in 1969-ϳϭ aŶd theŶ ƌetuƌŶed as the ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s “tƌategiĐ PlaŶŶeƌ, iŶtƌoduĐing 
a system of budgeting and five-year strategic plans.
18
 While strategic planning was kept firmly 
uŶdeƌ the ĐoŶtƌol of OĐeaŶ͛s oǁŶ eǆeĐutiǀes, the Ŷeǁ ĐoŵpaŶǇ stƌuĐtuƌe ǁas laƌgelǇ the ǁoƌk of 
Boston Consulting Group. It turned Ocean Steam Ship Co. Ltd. into a parent company with three 
main divisions (the so-called M-form or multidivisional structure that was a common outcome of 
company reorganisation in the UK at that time):
19
 Ocean Liners Ltd (OLL) took over the commercial 
operation of all liner ships from the hitheƌto sepaƌate liŶes ;OĐeaŶ͛s ŵaiŶ shippiŶg liŶe, Blue 
Funnel, as well as Elder Dempster, Glen, Henderson and the Dutch subsidy NSMO); Ocean Titan 
Ltd (OTL) managed non-liner shipping (tankers and bulk carriers) and Ocean Fleets Ltd (OFL) 
provided maintenance and manning services to all ships in the group. Another operating division 
was added when Ocean bought the logistics and services company Wm. Cory in 1973. Group 
strategy was in the hands of a three-man Executive Committee free from operational 
responsibility, exercising centralised control over the operational divisions run in a decentralised 
manner (see figure 1).
20
 Overseas Container Lines (OCL), as a joint venture with other leading 
British shipping lines, remained outside the new structure but relied on OFL for the manning and 
management of those of its ships that were owned by Ocean and was led by Ronald Swayne, an 
Ocean man. 
Strategic planning, diversification and the move to a multi-divisional structure were common 
responses to corporate crisis at the time and often involved the help of management consultants. 
Ocean nonetheless stood out among shipping companies by taking these steps proactively, in 
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response to clearly identified challenges. Ocean faced a decline in its traditional business of 
conventional liner shipping, not least because of the rise of container shipping. The company had 
substantial reserves, investments and tax allowances which made it an attractive target for a 
hostile takeover, in particular while its share price was dragged down by low profits in shipping in 
general and heavy initial losses in the new container business. In this situation, the solution 
seemed to be to use cash reserves and tax allowances to diversify away from shipping through the 
acquisition of new businesses in growth areas. At the same time, Ocean would use its expertise in 
manning, maintaining and operating ships to move into new, more profitable areas of shipping 
such as tankers, bulk and LNG carriers that were benefiting from the oil and raw materials booms, 
as well as to offer ship management services on the open market to third-party owners.
21
 Not all 
of these initiatives were successful. From 1973, bulk shipping suffered and eventually was 
abandoned and diversification developed much more slowly than initially envisaged, while liner 
shipping proved more resilient than expected. Nonetheless, by the mid-1980s Ocean had 
developed into a commercial services company with only a minor interest in shipping.  
Access to properly trained staff, in particular nautical and engineering officers who take a long 
time to train,
22
 is essential to running a shipping business, and in particular to running it well. 
Shipping had begun to face labour shortages in the post-War boom as a result of wages and 
working conditions that were lagging behind those offered on land. The industry had a long history 
of making inefficient use of large numbers of unskilled, underpaid manual labourers, including 
seafarers from developing countries who received even lower wages than their British colleagues. 
Rationalisation and automation in the 1960s were a response to rising wages, a shorter working 
week, more overtime payments, and the increasing reluctance of young Britons to commit to a 
career at sea, whether as ratings or officers.
23
 Containerisation, automation and economies of 
scale through the use of fewer, larger, more efficient ships reduced the demand for seafarers but 
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while the industry was undergoing both technological and organisational change and the British 
economy began to lurch from boom to bust it became very difficult to manage human resources 
so as to have the right number of staff with the right qualifications available at all times. With all 
shipping companies suffering from similar uncertainty, effective management of its human 
resources could give Ocean an edge over competitors.  
3.  MaŶual laďour aŶd OĐeaŶ͛s outsourĐiŶg strategy 
Together with the American-inspired science of management, notions of measuring business 
performance and profitability, of introducing a functional division of labour into organisations and 
operations, and of what later became known as outsourcing were spreading through British 
industry.
24
 We can see the role defined for OFL in the new company structure as an example of 
this trend: OFL became a service department charging the ship operating companies OLL and OTL 
for its services which it offered both to internal customers and on the open market, allowing other 
shipping firms to outsource ship management functions. The services provided by OFL covered all 
aspects of ship management, including manning and personnel management, maintenance, 
victualling, ship design, research, medical advice and examination, and even a linen department. 
Most of these operations were on a small scale; maintenance and, above all, manning (i.e., Human 
Resources) were the most important ones.  
OFL͛s keǇ fuŶĐtioŶ ǁas to eŵploǇ the ŶautiĐal aŶd eŶgiŶeeƌiŶg offiĐeƌs ǁho seƌǀed oŶ OĐeaŶ͛s 
ships (including those operated by OCL). Officers were company employees, usually joining as 
cadets when still in their teens. Wastage rates were high throughout the industry and Ocean was 
no exception in this respect. But Ocean took pride in having the best-trained officers and paying 
them enough to make them stay if they passed their exams and embraced a seafaring career. 
OĐeaŶ͛s offiĐeƌs ďeŶefited fƌoŵ suppoƌt iŶ aĐƋuiƌiŶg the pƌofessioŶal ĐeƌtifiĐates ƌeƋuiƌed foƌ 
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promotion as well as from a company pension scheme. Ratings (the seamen working on deck and 
in the engine room) were on short-term contracts. Some of them were British, hired through the 
Merchant Navy Establishment labour pools, the majority however were Asians and West Africans 
hired through local agencies with whom Ocean had long-standing relationships, having traded on 
imperial routes since the mid-19
th
 century.  
Ocean saw its expertise in training and managing a highly skilled workforce of officers and white 
collar employees while finding it increasingly difficult to manage manual labour. For example, 
Ocean had for a long time provided its own stevedoring (loading and unloading) services in major 
UK ports (Liverpool, London, Glasgow and Hull), convinced that doing this in-house would ensure 
higher quality and speed and give Ocean direct control over all aspects of handling the cargo 
entrusted to it by its customers. But in 1972-3, long before containerisation made it necessary to 
do so, Ocean decided to give up all its UK stevedoring operations. Some were closed, others 
transferred to local port authorities. The reason was the increasing power of unions, constant 
thƌeat of stoppages aŶd doĐkǁoƌkeƌs͛ deŵaŶds foƌ guaƌaŶteed eŵploǇŵeŶt so that it had, ͚iŶ 
practice, become impossible for us to alter the number of men employed, regardless of whether 
the ďusiŶess eǆpaŶded aŶd ĐoŶtƌaĐted͛. “teǀedoƌiŶg ǁas giǀeŶ up as a ƌesult of the ͚ŵouŶtaiŶous 
diffiĐulties͛ Đƌeated ďǇ fƌaĐtious iŶdustƌial ƌelatioŶs eǀeŶ though OĐeaŶ eǆpeĐted that this ǁould 
have a negative impact on the cost, speed and quality of the services it could offer.
25
  
This reluctance to continue employing a unionised blue collar workforce also seems to have 
shaped the ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s appƌoaĐh to ship ŵaiŶteŶaŶĐe. OĐeaŶ͛s ŵaiŶteŶaŶĐe fuŶĐtioŶs ǁeƌe sĐaled 
down and parts of the ship repair business were sold off with the intention of employing the new 
oǁŶeƌs͛ seƌǀiĐes foƌ fleet ŵaiŶteŶaŶĐe as aŶd ǁheŶ ƌeƋuiƌed – a classic example of outsourcing. 
OŶe ƌeasoŶ foƌ doiŶg this ǁas that, ǁith feǁeƌ, laƌgeƌ ships, OĐeaŶ͛s Ŷeed foƌ ŵaiŶteŶaŶĐe 
services was reduced. A second, more immediate one was the ͚fƌustƌatioŶ aŶd aĐƌiŵoŶǇ͛ of 
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iŶdustƌial ƌelatioŶs, the laĐk of ͚Đo-opeƌatioŶ fƌoŵ the laďouƌ foƌĐe͛, theiƌ ͚ĐoŶfused disĐoŶteŶt͛ 
aŶd appaƌeŶt uŶǁilliŶgŶess ͚to adapt ǁoƌkiŶg haďits to ŵodeƌŶ Ŷeeds iŶ aŶ atŵospheƌe of 
disciplined humanity and mutual self-ƌespeĐt͛, aloŶg ǁith the ͚ƌestƌiĐtiǀe pƌaĐtiĐes͛ iŵposed oŶ 
work as a result of jealousy between the twenty-two unions representing the workers in the 
yard.
26
 The shore gang, the maintenance workforce, were made redundant in 1976.
27
  
By the late 1960s, most shipping companies were shifting from a system where parts were 
replaced when they were worn out to one of scheduled maintenance, regular servicing and 
replacement of components after a specified service life. Ships were becoming technologically 
more complex, and often it was no longer possible to effect repairs with the skills, spares and tools 
available on board. With ever more valuable ships and cargoes and an increased emphasis on 
speed and regularity of service, the business risk of failures increased. In many companies, on the 
Continent but also in UK-based BP Tankers, maintenance was completely taken out of the hands 
of ships͛ Đƌeǁs. IŶstead, sĐheduled ŵaiŶteŶaŶĐe ǁould ďe uŶdeƌtakeŶ ďǇ speĐialised shoƌe-based 
staff, saving the time of scarce seafarers and allowing further reductions in crew size.
28
 This was in 
many ways a textbook solution – a complicated task occurring regularly but infrequently is taken 
out of the hands of relatively low-skilled and scarce seafarers and handed to a group of specialised 
skilled staff. If ďased iŶ the shippiŶg ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s hoŵe poƌt, theǇ ǁould ďe shoƌe staff, easieƌ to 
recruit than seafarers, and the whole function could even be outsourced to an outside 
ŵaiŶteŶaŶĐe fiƌŵ. GeƌŵaŶ studies aďout the ͚ship of the futuƌe͛ eŶǀisaged that ͚eǀeƌǇthiŶg that is 
possiďle is doŶe ashoƌe͛ to ďe aďle to ƌuŶ a ship ǁith as feǁ as tǁelǀe seafaƌeƌs.29  
Hoǁeǀeƌ OĐeaŶ ǁeŶt iŶ the opposite diƌeĐtioŶ, ŵakiŶg pƌoǀisioŶ ͚foƌ the iŶĐƌeased use of ships͛ 
crews, particularly non-British crews, for ǁoƌk ĐuƌƌeŶtlǇ peƌfoƌŵed ďǇ the shoƌe gaŶg.͛30 
Maintenance was as far as possible carried out during a voyage, either in port or at sea, and the 
regular crews were joined for that purpose by a small group of additional, specially trained 
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seafarers. It was eǆpeĐted that this ǁould ͚ƌeduĐe Đosts of ǁoƌk ǁhiĐh ŶoƌŵallǇ has a high 
iŶǀolǀeŵeŶt of shoƌe laďouƌ͛ as ǁell as ͚iŶĐƌease the joď satisfaĐtioŶ aŶd Đost ĐoŶsĐiousŶess of 
ships͛ peƌsoŶŶel.͛ AŶotheƌ adǀaŶtage of doiŶg ŵaiŶteŶaŶĐe ǁoƌk at sea ǁas that it ŵiŶimised the 
time a ship spent in port or out of service altogether.
31
 Finally, it was possible to make productive 
use of seamen who were on board only because of legal minimum manning requirements and not 
because their presence was indispensable to operate the ship. Increased involvement of seafarers 
iŶ shipďoaƌd ŵaiŶteŶaŶĐe ǁas ƌegaƌded as suĐĐessful aŶd pƌoduĐed the desiƌed ͚eĐoŶoŵies iŶ 
ƌepaiƌ Đosts͛ ǁithiŶ the fiƌst Ǉeaƌ.32 One reason Ocean decided to rely as far as possible on the 
labour of its sea staff was that many ratings, and almost all engine-room ratings, were non-
domiciled seafarers from China and Africa. With access to non-unionised foreign labour and a 
confrontational attitude of unionised domestic shore staff, Ocean – like some other shipping 
companies in a similar situation – found the text-book solution based on specialisation and a 
deeper division of labour less efficient than carrying out maintenance at sea. 
The eŵploǇŵeŶt of ͚ŶoŶ-doŵs͛ at ǁages suďstaŶtiallǇ ďeloǁ those paid to UK seafaƌeƌs ǁas 
allowed under an exemption from non-discrimination legislation granted to the shipping industry, 
but it was increasingly difficult to justify and threatened by legislative change under the Labour 
government that came to power in 1974.
33
 The lower wages paid to these ratings were only one 
aspeĐt of OĐeaŶ͛s iŶteƌest iŶ eŵploǇiŶg theŵ, though defiŶitelǇ aŶ iŵpoƌtaŶt oŶe: IŶ ϭϵϳϱ, OĐeaŶ 
estimated that paying UK wages to non-domiciled seafarers would cost the Group £2.7m a year 
aŶd ͚aďout half of ouƌ liŶeƌ fleet i.e. aďout Ϯϱ ships … ǁould ďe iŶ daŶgeƌ of ďeĐoŵiŶg uŶǀiaďle iŶ 
theiƌ paƌtiĐulaƌ tƌades͛.34 BeǇoŶd that, hoǁeǀeƌ, eŵploǇeƌs fouŶd ͚it ŶeĐessaƌǇ to ƌetaiŶ foƌeigŶ 
seamen, even if wages were increased, in order to avoid a sudden demand for and artificial 
sĐaƌĐitǇ of U.K. seaŵeŶ.͛ OĐeaŶ eǆeĐutiǀes spoke of the ͚shoƌtage of aĐĐeptaďle UK ƌatiŶgs͛ aŶd 
the ͚stƌaŶglehold͛ eǆeƌĐised ďǇ the NatioŶal UŶioŶ of “eaŵeŶ oǀeƌ the supplǇ of seaŵeŶ. OFL͛s 
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financial report for 1974 stated that despite substantial pay rises throughout the sector in the UK, 
͚gƌeat diffiĐultǇ is still ďeiŶg eǆpeƌieŶĐed ďǇ all ship oǁŶeƌs iŶ ŵaiŶtaiŶiŶg the ŵiŶiŵuŵ ŶeĐessaƌǇ 
ŵaŶpoǁeƌ leǀels.͛ AŶd ǁhile OFL ƌealised that ͚paǇiŶg soŵe Đategoƌies of eŵploǇees oŶ a ŵuĐh 
lower level than others was Ŷot Đoŵpatiďle ǁith OĐeaŶ͛s ĐoŶsĐieŶĐe as aŶ eŵploǇeƌ͛, the faĐt that 
the non-doŵs͛ hoŵe ĐouŶtƌies ǁeƌe fieƌĐelǇ opposed to higheƌ paǇ foƌ theiƌ ŶatioŶals 
conveniently alleviated such concerns.
35
 
Maintaining access to overseas labour was important for Ocean, and this was threatened not only 
by proposed legislation requiring British wages for non-domiciled seafarers. In addition, keeping in 
touch with seafarers and manning agents by reliably offering employment opportunities became 
more and more difficult as fleet size deĐliŶed. “ooŶ, OFL ǁeƌe ͚ǁoƌƌied at the dƌastiĐ ƌeduĐtioŶ iŶ 
the Ŷuŵďeƌ of ChiŶese ƌatiŶgs due to the sale of ships͛. The ChiŶese ǁeƌe ƌegaƌded as ͚a highlǇ 
skilled ĐoŵpoŶeŶt of ouƌ seafaƌiŶg eǆpeƌtise͛, aŶd giǀiŶg up the foothold iŶ the HoŶg Kong labour 
ŵaƌket ǁould leaǀe OFL ͚ǁith all ouƌ eggs iŶ a Bƌitish oƌ West AfƌiĐaŶ ďasket͛.36 It was discovered 
that, from a human resources point of view, fleet size could not be flexibly scaled up and down at 
will; reducing it beyond a certain point implied giving up access to a pool of labour that was 
necessary for any future expansion. While Ocean delayed decisions about fleet size in 1976-77, it 
sought to maintain a foothold in the Hong Kong labour market. Once the decision to plan for a 
permanently reduced fleet had been made Chinese crewing was abandoned altogether.
37
  
As a general rule, Ocean seems to have sought to avoid the direct employment of UK-based, 
unionised manual labour. Activities such as stevedoring and maintenance were outsourced and 
Ocean managers were willing to accept a higher costs and lower quality in such services as the 
price to pay for extricating the company from involvement in UK industrial relations. The ratings 
eŵploǇed oŶ OĐeaŶ͛s ships ǁeƌe Ŷot peƌŵaŶeŶt eŵploǇees of the ĐoŵpaŶy and many were 
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seafarers from developing countries who were not members of UK unions and remained outside 
the cultural and institutional setting of UK industrial relations. 
4.  Third-party ship ŵaŶageŵeŶt ;TPSMͿ aŶd OĐeaŶ͛s offiĐer workforĐe 
While Ocean was seeking to reduce direct employment of unskilled manual labour, it put 
ĐoŶsideƌaďle effoƌt iŶto ŵaŶagiŶg offiĐeƌ staff Ŷuŵďeƌs. OFL͛s ŵaŶageƌs alǁaǇs had a Đleaƌ idea of 
the officer numbers required for a given level of company activity and were aware of wastage 
rates, training requirements, salary levels within the industry. Advanced manpower planning 
techniques were applied only to the shore-based managerial staff.
38
 Paternalistic concern for the 
ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s eŵploǇees ǁas stƌoŶg, aŶd, iŶ iŶteƌŶal disĐussioŶ, fiŶdiŶg ĐoŶtiŶued eŵploǇŵeŶt foƌ 
highly valued officers and ship managers at a time when the prospects for traditional general 
cargo liner shipping were dim was frequently given as a key reason for strategic decisions. The 
tanker and bulk trades were entered in the late 1960s not only because they seemed more 
profitable than liner shipping, but also because, unlike radical diversification away from shipping, 
they would allow Ocean to continue to make use of its existing sea staff and shipping expertise. 
Ocean always saw itself as dependent on the quality and dedication of staff and hoped to provide 
͚ƌeǁaƌdiŶg Đaƌeeƌs͛ foƌ theŵ. TakiŶg stoĐk afteƌ the ƌestƌuĐtuƌiŶg of 1971-ϯ, OĐeaŶ͛s ϭϵϳϯ aŶŶual 
ƌepoƌt listed fouƌ stƌategiĐ oďjeĐtiǀes, ǁith ďuildiŶg oŶ aŶd deǀelopiŶg the ͚Ƌuite eǆĐeptioŶal 
ƋualitǇ aŶd dediĐatioŶ͛ of its staff at the top. ‘eduĐtioŶ of depeŶdeŶĐe oŶ liŶeƌ shippiŶg aŶd 
expansion in bulk trades was the second objective, expansion into non-marine activities the third 
and expansion in continental Europe and Southeast Asia (i.e. reduced dependence on the UK) the 
fourth.
39
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From expansion to uncertainty 
This foĐus oŶ eŵploǇees as OĐeaŶ͛s keǇ ƌesouƌĐe ŵade it difficult to shift away from shipping 
altogether when expansion in bulk shipping came to a sudden halt in the early 1970s as a result of 
overcapacity and the 1973 oil crisis. From then on, it was hoped to turn the acquisition of Third-
party ship management (TPSM) business into a means of employing the officer and engineer 
workforce. Though only managing three ships for other owners, Ocean had experience in costing 
and supplying ship management services to its own ships operated by OCL. It was hoped that as 
Third-World countries were setting up shipping companies without having access to qualified 
seafarers and managers, OFL could make money by supplying officers and organising supplies, 
maintenance, and other aspects of ship operation. It was also envisaged that OFL might make use 
of OĐeaŶ͛s ƌeputatioŶ aŶd high staŶdaƌds of paǇ aŶd aĐĐoŵŵodatioŶ to attƌaĐt additioŶal staff foƌ 
its TP“M ďusiŶess. The ďusiŶess plaŶ foƌ OFL͛s TP“M aĐtiǀities set out thƌee oďjeĐtiǀes: ͚;aͿ To 
improve the morale of seafarers. (b) To make a profit. (c) To benefit other Group business 
ƌelatioŶs.͛40 Staff morale was placed first, demonstrating the rationale for engaging in TPSM. 
OĐeaŶ ďelieǀed: ͚The key resource is manpower.͛ IŶ aŶ iŶdustƌǇ ͚despeƌatelǇ shoƌt of seafaƌeƌs͛, iŶ 
particular offiĐeƌs, OĐeaŶ had to ͚ďuild up aŶd ƌetaiŶ a loǇal sea staff.͛41 Losing scarce skilled staff 
to Đoŵpetitoƌs Đould seǀeƌelǇ ƌestƌiĐt OĐeaŶ͛s aďilitǇ to ŵaŶ aŶd opeƌate its oǁŶ ships. But if 
Ocean managed its human resources better than the competitors, it could hope to make a profit 
fƌoŵ shippiŶg as ǁell as fƌoŵ selliŶg ship ŵaŶageŵeŶt seƌǀiĐes to ĐoŵpaŶies ǁho ǁeƌe ͚uŶaďle 
thƌough shoƌtage of Ŷuŵďeƌs to ĐoŶtiŶue to ŵaŶ theiƌ oǁŶ ships.͛42 For these reasons, human 
resources took centre stage in company strategy.  
IŶ theoƌǇ, OĐeaŶ͛s pƌioƌities ǁeƌe Đleaƌ: OFL ǁas to pƌoǀide seafaƌeƌs foƌ OĐeaŶ͛s oǁŶ ships aŶd 
eŶgage iŶ TP“M aĐtiǀities, giǀiŶg ͚pƌioƌitǇ to Gƌoup iŶteƌests at all tiŵes͛ aŶd appƌoaĐhiŶg TP“M 
pƌojeĐts ͚iŶ a pƌofit-oriented and business-like ŵaŶŶeƌ͛. The business plan cautioned that TPSM 
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should Ŷot ďe seeŶ ͚as a Ǉeaƌ to Ǉeaƌ ŵethod of ͞sŵoothiŶg oǀeƌ͟ peaks aŶd tƌoughs iŶ Gƌoup 
ship Ŷuŵďeƌs͛ – at least ͚iŶ the aďseŶĐe of a ĐoŶtƌaĐtioŶ iŶ the Ŷuŵďeƌ of Gƌoup ships͛.43 Yet, 
contraction in the number of ships aŶd uŶĐeƌtaiŶtǇ oǀeƌ the futuƌe eǆteŶt of OĐeaŶ͛s shippiŶg 
activities were precisely the problems that dominated the agenda from 1975 onwards.
44
 Indeed, 
TP“M ǁas ŵost ofteŶ disĐussed Ŷot iŶ teƌŵs of eǆploitiŶg the ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s pƌoǀeŶ stƌeŶgths ďut as 
a tool to manage staff numbers. 
Considerable discussion took place in the middle of 1975 about the role and importance of TPSM 
contracts for OFL and for the Group as a whole. It was recognised that, for Ocean, TPSM was 
primarily about manning ships rather than maintaining and operating them, and that this business 
ǁas ͚Ŷot per se paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ attƌaĐtiǀe.͛ Theƌe ǁas Ŷo Ŷeed foƌ it ǁheŶ good offiĐeƌs ǁeƌe iŶ shoƌt 
supplǇ aŶd all of theŵ ǁeƌe ƌeƋuiƌed foƌ OĐeaŶ͛s oǁŶ ships, ǁhile a suƌplus of offiĐeƌs ǁould 
usually arise as a result of a downturn in the industry when it would be difficult to find profitable 
TPSM business.
45
 Nonetheless, the Marine Committee, the body co-ordinating the activities of 
OĐeaŶ͛s thƌee ŵaƌiŶe diǀisioŶs, saǁ ƌeasoŶs to peƌsist ǁith TP“M.46 The most important of these 
ǁas ŵoƌale: ͚To the eǆteŶt – and it will be a considerable extent – that our marine activities will 
continue to generate a large part of our profits, our seafarers will remain essential to our future 
profitability. They represent, theƌefoƌe, a highlǇ ǀaluaďle, aŶd ĐuƌƌeŶtlǇ sĐaƌĐe, ƌesouƌĐe.͛ While 
OĐeaŶ ǁas selliŶg off oldeƌ ships, TP“M ĐoŶtƌaĐts ǁeƌe Ŷeeded ͚iŶ oƌdeƌ to ŵaiŶtaiŶ ship Ŷuŵďeƌs 
– and to avoid a belief in the Fleet that we are committed to a policy of ship contractioŶ.͛47 The 
second reason for persisting with TPSM was that it might be the only way for Ocean to establish a 
foothold in growing markets such as the Middle East where governments insisted on building up 
their own national shipping companies. While OLL, OceaŶ͛s liŶeƌ shippiŶg diǀisioŶ, feaƌed TP“M 
would have a negative impact on its own manning needs, the Marine Committee decided that 
TP“M ǁas ͚ŶeĐessaƌǇ to ĐoŶǀiŶĐe the Fleet … that OFL ǁas Ŷot a shƌiŶkiŶg ďusiŶess͛, offeƌiŶg a 
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͚useful ďoost to ŵoƌale͛.48 These discussions made it clear that shipping was to a considerable 
eǆteŶt a ͚people ďusiŶess.͛ This Đaŵe ǁith speĐifiĐ ƌisks aŶd ĐoŵŵitŵeŶts, suĐh as ǁoƌƌǇiŶg aďout 
staff ŵoƌale, as ǁell as ͚ƌeduŶdaŶĐǇ ƌisks oƌ additioŶal peŶsioŶ ĐoŵŵitŵeŶts ǁhiĐh ǁeƌe likelǇ to 
ďe iŶĐƌeasiŶglǇ ďuƌdeŶsoŵe͛.49  
Barely profitable TPSM contracts continued to be considered because they would allow Ocean to 
haŶg oŶ to staff aŶd ͚to eŶaďle the Gƌoup to gƌasp aŶǇ futuƌe oppoƌtuŶities foƌ eǆpaŶsioŶ͛.50 Such 
opportunities always seemed to be just around the corner but never actually materialised. Global 
ƌeĐessioŶ aŶd the UK͛s speĐifiĐ eĐoŶoŵiĐ diffiĐulties ŵade foƌ a ͚ǀeƌǇ ďleak͛ outlook foƌ all of 
OĐeaŶ͛s ďusiŶesses ďǇ eaƌlǇ ϭϵϳϲ.51 With the effects of cyclical recession and structural change in 
the industry superimposed upon each other, the situation was difficult to read. Initially, profits in 
the new bulk shipping and non-marine activities were hit particularly hard, while they held up 
pretty well in the remaining liner shipping operations where freight rates were set by cartel-like 
͚ĐoŶfeƌeŶĐes͛.52 For the moment, Ocean had to give up on its medium-term ambition of turning 
itself from a liner shipping company into one earning roughly a third of its profits each in liners, 
bulk, and non-marine activities. It was now assumed that the decline in liner business would be 
slower than forecast and that the fleet would shrink from 70 ships in 1974 to 61 in 1981 and then 
remain at that level (see table 3). Even this modest run-down, however, would require a reduction 
iŶ sea aŶd shoƌe staff ǁith daŶgeƌous huŵaŶ ƌesouƌĐes iŵpliĐatioŶs, iŶĐludiŶg a ͚deĐliŶe iŶ fleet 
morale; an adverse effect upon Fleet recruitment; a possible lowering of standards in 
consequence and therefore a decline in those very skills upon which we depend both to maintain 
ouƌ eǆistiŶg ŵaƌiŶe ďusiŶess aŶd ŵaƌket positioŶs; aŶd to eǆpaŶd.͛ This stateŵeŶt highlights hoǁ 
fƌagile OĐeaŶ͛s situatioŶ as a ĐoŵpaŶǇ depeŶdiŶg pƌiŵaƌilǇ oŶ skilled staff ǁas at a tiŵe of 
structural change and global recession.
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OĐeaŶ͛s eŶtiƌe ŵaŶageŵeŶt stƌuĐtuƌe had ďeeŶ desigŶed iŶ the ďooŵ ĐoŶditioŶs of the eaƌlǇ 
1970s to underpin expansion into new marine and non-marine activities, raising expectations that 
Ŷoǁ gaǀe ǁaǇ to disappoiŶtŵeŶt aŶd ĐƌeatiŶg a ͚fat oǀeƌhead͛ that ͚Đould Ŷot ďe iŶdefiŶitelǇ 
sustaiŶed͛. Theƌe ǁas a ĐhoiĐe ďetǁeeŶ ĐoŶtƌaĐtioŶ oƌ a ƌeŶeǁed atteŵpt at eǆpaŶsioŶ: eitheƌ to 
͚ƌaise the leǀel of Gƌoup aĐtiǀitǇ iŶ oƌdeƌ to: utilise the ĐapaĐitǇ of ouƌ ŵaŶageŵeŶt stƌuĐtuƌe; 
meet the aspirations of our staff; obviate the need to contract our management structure; and in 
particular, to prevent any further erosion of our marine base; or: to contract the management 
stƌuĐtuƌe to ŵatĐh the leǀel of Gƌoup aĐtiǀitǇ.͛ This ĐhoiĐe ǁas Ŷot ŵade. DuƌiŶg ϭ976, Ocean 
ǁoƌked to a ͚holdiŶg plaŶ͛ ǁhile seekiŶg to ideŶtifǇ gƌoǁth oppoƌtuŶities.54 
The ĐhalleŶge of ŵaŶagiŶg OĐeaŶ͛s ŵaŶpoǁeƌ uŶdeƌ these ĐoŶditioŶs had ƌepeƌĐussioŶs oŶ the 
whole company. Already in January 1976, OLL was authorised to charter out three or four of its 
ships at a loss, ͚iŶ oƌdeƌ to help ŵiŶiŵise oǀeƌŵaŶŶiŶg aŶd ƌeduŶdaŶĐǇ Đosts iŶ O.F.L.͛55 Older, 
inefficient ships were kept in service rather than sold or laid up just to provide employment for sea 
staff. OFL was asked to aggressively seek TPSM contracts to allow Ocean to sell older ships and 
transfer seafarers to ships managed for third-party owners. It is a sign of the depressed state of 
the iŶdustƌǇ that sooŶ it ǁas ĐoŶsideƌed to ͚go ďeloǁ ďƌeak-even figures if necessary to obtain 
other ship management contracts as a less expensive alternative to run-doǁŶ aŶd ƌeduŶdaŶĐies.͛ 
TP“M thus Đaŵe to oĐĐupǇ a ĐeŶtƌal ƌole iŶ OĐeaŶ͛s plaŶs, aŶd ǁhile iŶitiallǇ TP“M ǁas to ďe used 
to employ surplus staff and keep promotion opportunities open, it now became necessary to hold 
on to surplus staff while seeking TPSM contracts so as to be able to offer well qualified officers on 
the open market.
56
 IŶ additioŶ, TP“M affeĐted OĐeaŶ Gƌoup͛s ŵaŶageŵeŶt of its ƌatiŶgs: As the 
National Union of Seafarers had a veto over the manning of new ships with non-UK seafarers, 
OĐeaŶ͛s aďilitǇ to ŵaŶ its oǁŶ ships iŶ this ǁaǇ ǁas likelǇ to ďe ĐoŶstƌaiŶed if OĐeaŶ upset the 
NUS by offering cheap TPSM contracts based on low-cost non-UK manning.
57
 
 17 
Ocean were reluctant to consider redundancies, because of the considerable cost involved and 
also because it was feared that wastage rates would increase and morale plummet. HR 
considerations thus were key in tipping the balance away from contraction and towards increased 
use of TPSM coŶtƌaĐts to deŵoŶstƌate ͚ƌesolǀe to ŵaiŶtaiŶ a ďƌoad ŵaƌiŶe ďase͛ aŶd ŵake 
pƌoŵotioŶ oppoƌtuŶities aǀailaďle to all Ƌualified staff. OFL͛s ďoaƌd ĐoŶĐluded: ͚EǀeƌǇ eŶdeaǀouƌ 
ŵust ďe ŵade to ƌetaiŶ good ĐeƌtifiĐated ŵeŶ aŶd to keep pƌoŵotioŶ ŵoǀiŶg͛.58 Morale was seen 
as ͚a ǀital faĐtoƌ iŶ ƌetaiŶiŶg ŵotiǀated sea staff͛, aŶd ǀaƌious ŵeasuƌes ǁeƌe takeŶ to iŵpƌoǀe it, 
ranging from refurbishing the accommodation on older vessels to speeding up promotions by 
retiring senior staff.
59
  
Over the spring of 1976, OFL energetically pursued negotiations with several British and overseas 
companies over various TPSM contracts, but to no avail.
60
 Some of the firms approached were 
dƌaggiŶg theiƌ feet, otheƌs ǁeƌe deeŵed uŶsuitaďle as theiƌ ͚ďusiŶess ethiĐs ǁeƌe ďeloǁ ouƌ 
standaƌds.͛61 BǇ late ϭϵϳϲ, ͚sǇsteŵatiĐ Đƌeǁ ƌeduĐtioŶs͛ had ďeĐoŵe iŶeǀitaďle. To ŵiŶiŵise ĐostlǇ 
redundancy procedures, underperforming staff such as uncertified Third Officers who had 
repeatedly failed their examinations were targeted, and a number of senior officers were offered 
retirement on medical grounds.
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IŶ “epteŵďeƌ ϭϵϳϲ, the MaƌiŶe Coŵŵittee ĐoŶĐluded that ͚the ĐoŵiŶg ϭϮ ŵoŶths ǁas likelǇ to ďe 
ĐƌitiĐal to OĐeaŶ͛s ŵaŶpoǁeƌ positioŶ͛. OĐeaŶ deĐided to teŶdeƌ foƌ a Ŷuŵďeƌ of TP“M ĐoŶtƌaĐts 
with Libya at break-eǀeŶ pƌiĐe ďeĐause this ǁould ďe ͚ďetteƌ thaŶ ĐhaƌteƌiŶg out suƌplus oǁŶed 
ǀessels at a loss͛ aŶd ďeĐause ͚this ďusiŶess ǁould ŵaiŶtaiŶ eŵploǇŵeŶt of ǀaluaďle peƌsoŶŶel 
uŶtil TP“M pƌospeĐts hopefullǇ iŵpƌoǀed.͛63 By this time, TPSM contracts for at least ten ships 
were required to avoid further redundancies.
64
 Ocean, like other shipping companies, were trying 
to ƌetaiŶ suƌplus seŶioƌ offiĐeƌs iŶ ǀieǁ of a possiďle ƌeǀiǀal iŶ ďusiŶess ǁhile ͚good juŶioƌs ǁeƌe 
sĐaƌĐe͛ – a situation in response to which Ocean had expanded their cadet training programme in 
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1974 and 1975, now taking in 75 deck officer and 60 engineering cadets a year. With all firms 
holding on to their staff, the expected surplus of officers on the open market did not materialise, 
constrainiŶg OĐeaŶ͛s aďilitǇ to teŶdeƌ foƌ laƌgeƌ TP“M ĐoŶtƌaĐts ǁhile ŵakiŶg it all the ŵoƌe 
necessary to hold on to, and find something to do for, existing staff.
65
 
WheŶ OFL͛s stƌategiĐ plaŶ foƌ ϭϵϳϳ-81 was approved by the Board in November 1976, it was 
noted that the ͚ŵaŶŶiŶg issue ǁas the ŵost ĐƌitiĐal oŶe͛. Despite the ǁaƌŶiŶgs giǀeŶ ďǇ the 
Marine Committee at the beginning of the year that loss-making TPSM contracts were acceptable 
oŶlǇ teŵpoƌaƌilǇ, the pƌefeƌeŶĐe still ǁas foƌ haŶgiŶg oŶ to staff ͚iŶ aŶtiĐipation of management 
ĐoŶtƌaĐts, eǀeŶ if the ďudget had to shoǁ a defiĐit.͛66 Surplus manning and redundancies turned 
out to ďe ŵoƌe ĐostlǇ thaŶ aŶtiĐipated aŶd hoŶouƌiŶg OFL͛s ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt to keep offiĐeƌs͛ salaƌies 
͚iŶ the top Ƌuaƌtile of Đoŵpaƌaďle ĐoŵpaŶies͛ added to the expense. Further savings on staff costs 
were unavoidable, and considerations of morale pointed to making these by reducing staff 
numbers rather than by depressing salaries. Although ongoing talks about TPSM projects that 
would require large number of officers at short notice made it difficult to arrive at a clear line of 
aĐtioŶ, aŶ iŶĐƌease iŶ offiĐeƌs͛ salaƌies ǁas agƌeed sooŶ afteƌ, aloŶgside fuƌtheƌ ƌeduŶdaŶĐies.67 
The problem of engineer overstaffing solved itself, with 131 of them leaving in 1976, many of 
whom went into shore jobs (a wastage rate of 17%, against 12% for nautical officers and 20% for 
cadets). With eight surplus ships kept in the fleet to prevent redundancies, towards the middle of 
ϭϵϳϳ OFL͛s ŵaŶpoǁeƌ ƌesouƌĐes ǁeƌe ŵoŵeŶtaƌily stretched, showing the effects of continuing 
uŶĐeƌtaiŶtǇ oŶ OFL͛s aďilitǇ to effeĐtiǀelǇ ŵaŶage the Gƌoup͛s laďouƌ foƌĐe.68 
Preparing the Group Strategic Plan for 1977-81 took until February 1977 amid continuing 
uncertainty in the global economy and in shipping markets. Liner shipping still dominated Group 
aĐtiǀitǇ aŶd pƌofits, ďut it ǁas ĐleaƌlǇ iŶ deĐliŶe ;see taďle ϰͿ. The ͚oǀeƌsupplǇ of toŶŶage͛ ǁas 
expected to get worse due to the shipbuilding subsidies paid by many governments. While 
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OĐeaŶ͛s fiŶaŶĐial ƌesults foƌ ϭϵϳϲ had ďeeŶ good, aŶd eǆpaŶsioŶ, iŶĐludiŶg the ͚ĐƌeatioŶ of ŵoƌe 
eŵploǇŵeŶt pƌospeĐts͛, ǁas listed as oŶe of the ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s keǇ oďjeĐtiǀes, plaŶs foƌ iŶǀestiŶg the 
cash raised by selling assets and by a rights issue early in 1976 were lacking. The expansion of 
TP“M ďusiŶess despite ͚ouƌ pƌeseŶt liŵited suĐĐess iŶ this field͛ ǁas pƌoposed to ĐoŵpeŶsate foƌ a 
quicker reduction in ship numbers, which were now envisaged to reach 50 rather than 61 by 1981. 
Expanding TPSM, it was hoped, would allow the company to shift away from low-profit, mature 
seĐtoƌs suĐh as liŶeƌ shippiŶg iŶ the ŵediuŵ teƌŵ ǁhile, iŶ the shoƌt teƌŵ, pƌeǀeŶtiŶg aŶ ͚eƌosioŶ 
of ouƌ ŵaƌiŶe ďase͛, ƌeduŶdaŶĐies, deĐliŶe iŶ ͚fleet ŵoƌale͛ aŶd a ͚shoƌtage of seafaƌeƌs to ŵaŶ 
ships͛ iŶ case the long awaited expansion materialised.69  
Douďts oǀeƌ the futuƌe diƌeĐtioŶ of OĐeaŶ͛s aĐtiǀities ǁeƌe pƌofouŶd at that tiŵe. The ϭϵϳϳ Gƌoup 
“tƌategiĐ PlaŶ aĐkŶoǁledged OĐeaŶ͛s ͚peƌsoŶŶel pƌoďleŵs …, soŵe of ǁhiĐh deƌiǀe fƌoŵ ĐhaŶges 
in the external eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt, otheƌs fƌoŵ ĐhaŶges ǁithiŶ OĐeaŶ͛s oǁŶ ďusiŶess.͛ The shippiŶg 
Đƌisis ǁas oŶlǇ oŶe of the ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s ǁoƌƌies. “oaƌiŶg iŶflatioŶ aŶd puďliĐ eǆpeŶdituƌe, geŶeƌalised 
eĐoŶoŵiĐ uŶdeƌpeƌfoƌŵaŶĐe, ͚a geŶeƌal laĐk of ďusiŶess ĐoŶfideŶĐe͛, the iŶĐƌeasing influence of 
the tƌades uŶioŶs, plaŶs to iŵpleŵeŶt ͚iŶdustƌial deŵoĐƌaĐǇ͛ aŶd ŶatioŶalise ǀast sǁathes of 
industries (including banks, ports, shipbuilding, ship repair) made the UK appear as an 
unpropitious place to do business. The 1977 Strategic Plan discussed to what extent Ocean should 
seek to ǁithdƌaǁ fƌoŵ the UK ͚ǁhiĐh is ĐhaƌaĐteƌised ďǇ sloǁ gƌoǁth, a ǁeak ĐuƌƌeŶĐǇ, eǆĐessiǀe 
legislatioŶ aŶd ĐuƌƌeŶtlǇ is Ŷot ĐoŶduĐiǀe to the ĐƌeatioŶ of ǁealth͛, aŶd fƌoŵ the tƌaŶspoƌt seĐtoƌ 
where increasing government intervention seemed likely. The company considered radically 
shiftiŶg its aĐtiǀities toǁaƌds aƌeas ͚suĐh as ŵaŶufaĐtuƌiŶg? leisuƌe? ŵiŶiŶg? eŶgiŶeeƌiŶg? oƌ 
ǁhat?͛ A little eaƌlieƌ, ͚tƌaŶsfeƌƌiŶg seĐtioŶs of the Gƌoup͛s shippiŶg aĐtiǀities to aŶ oǀeƌseas flag͛ 
had ďeeŶ ĐoŶsideƌed, foƌ fisĐal ƌeasoŶs as ǁell as foƌ ͚iŶsulatioŶ fƌoŵ laďouƌ pƌoďleŵs iŶ U.K.͛70 
This accumulation of question marks in a strategic plan betrays a certain amount of desperation 
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but it should be noted that Ocean was by no means alone in facing such existential uncertainty – 
the whole shipping industry was in a similar situation, along with, for example, many of the 
multinational trading companies studied by Geoffrey Jones.
71
 
Ocean saw it as risky to be in a people-intensive business ͚iŶ aŶ eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt of high 
uŶeŵploǇŵeŶt aŶd high iŶflatioŶ͛.72 At the same time, however, Ocean wanted to see itself as a 
͚ƌespoŶsiďle eŵploǇeƌ͛ aŶd ͚plaŶ the deǀelopŵeŶt of the Gƌoup͛s huŵaŶ ƌesouƌĐes so as to 
eŶsuƌe that all OĐeaŶ͛s staff aƌe pƌopeƌlǇ and equitably treated and have the opportunity to fulfill 
;siĐͿ theiƌ poteŶtial.͛ IŶ the eŶd, H‘ ĐoŶsideƌatioŶs ǁeƌe sigŶifiĐaŶt iŶ deĐidiŶg agaiŶst leaǀiŶg the 
UK ďehiŶd. While it ƌeŵaiŶed ĐoŵpaŶǇ stƌategǇ ͚to ƌeduĐe ouƌ depeŶdeŶĐe oŶ the U.K. eĐoŶoŵǇ͛, 
͚[d]eliberate contraction of Ocean in U.K. is ruled out if we really mean to be a responsible 
eŵploǇeƌ.͛73 Accordingly, while uncertainty persisted it was agreed that TPSM had to be 
͚ĐoŶtiŶued iŶ oƌdeƌ to eŶsuƌe seĐuƌitǇ aŶd fleǆiďilitǇ iŶ tiŵes of fluĐtuatiŶg demand and to 
faĐilitate a tƌeŶd toǁaƌds loǁeƌ pƌoŵotioŶ ages.͛74 
From uncertainty to contraction 
“hippiŶg still aĐĐouŶted foƌ ϳϬ% of OĐeaŶ͛s pƌofits, ďut oŶlǇ ϯϬ% of tuƌŶoǀeƌ, iŶ ϭϵϳϳ. The 
following year, shipping produced a loss.
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 Late 1977 marks something of a turning point in 
OĐeaŶ͛s ǀieǁ of the futuƌe of its shippiŶg aĐtiǀities aŶd ŵaƌiŶe laďouƌ foƌĐe. It ǁas Ŷoǁ aĐĐepted 
that the shipping crisis was much deeper and would last much longer than initially thought. 
OĐeaŶ͛s LNG Đaƌƌier Nestor, ordered at a price of more than £60m in order to provide the 
company with a secure stream of profits from a promising new sector of shipping went straight 
from the shipyard to Loch Striven to be laid up (alongside its Dutch-owned sister ship, Gastor). It 
ƌeŵaiŶed theƌe, idle, uŶtil sold off iŶ ϭϵϴϵ. The fiŶal dƌaft of OFL͛s stƌategiĐ plaŶ foƌ ϭϵϳϴ-82 was 
based on a fleet of 58 ships (down from 66 the previous year), with alternative scenarios for 45 
and 49 ships. A confidential meeting early in February 1978 concluded that manning requirements 
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had to be revised for a fleet of only 42 ships, immediately creating a surplus of 325 officers (see 
table 5 for the development of employee numbers up to that point). Far from representing any 
savings, this meant budgeting for substantial redundancy payments.
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A ĐƌitiĐal ƌeassessŵeŶt of OĐeaŶ͛s appƌoaĐh to TP“M aŶd ŵaŶŶiŶg folloǁed. It ǁas Ŷoǁ ƌealised 
that TPSM and other short-teƌŵ deǀiĐes to pƌeǀeŶt the ͚eƌosioŶ of the ŵaƌiŶe ďase͛ aŶd keep up 
staff numbers and morale while waiting for growth opportunities to emerge had been costly and 
futile. Ocean was left with surplus staff operating outdated ships at a loss – a situation 
representative of much of British industry at the time. The Marine Committee concluded that 
͚failuƌe to sell uŶǁaŶted assets oŶ a falliŶg ŵaƌket iŶ oƌdeƌ to pƌoteĐt eŵploǇŵeŶt had left the 
Gƌoup iŶ a ǁoƌse positioŶ aŶd ǁith feǁeƌ optioŶs to aĐhieǀe that oďjeĐtiǀe.͛ HaŶgiŶg oŶ to the 
Priam class ships designed in the late 1950s which were unsuited to the container age had 
prevented Ocean from acquiring or chartering modern tonnage. In future, Ocean would have to 
͚ďe ŵoƌe ƌespoŶsiǀe to ŵaƌket ĐoŶditioŶs͛ ǁheŶ deĐidiŶg to ďuǇ aŶd sell ships.77 Older ships had 
to be sold off for scrap value as the market had collapsed – all shipowners were building large 
container ships and transferring suddenly outdated conventional ships, still only a few years old, 
to the remaining non-containerised routes.
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 British shipowners have been criticised for their 
reluctance or inability to make a profit from buying and selling ships at the appropriate time.
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OĐeaŶ͛s eǆaŵple suggests that at least iŶ this Đase the ƌeasoŶ ǁas a ƌesult of theiƌ H‘ stƌategǇ. 
With the shipping industry now in its deepest depression since the 1930s, it was clear that 1978 
ǁould ͚Ŷot ďe aŶ easǇ Ǉeaƌ͛. Fƌoŵ late ϭϵϳϳ, OFL ǁas seƌiouslǇ ͚lookiŶg at ƌeduĐiŶg Ŷuŵďeƌs 
ashoƌe aŶd afloat͛ aŶd ƌedouďliŶg effoƌts to iŵpƌoǀe ŵaŶageŵeŶt of the fleet oŶ ďoth aŶ 
operational and a strategic level.
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 Operational changes introduced in the mid-70s included 
ŵakiŶg ŵoƌe effiĐieŶt use of the Masteƌs͛ tiŵe duƌiŶg loŶg ǀoǇages aŶd ƌeduĐiŶg the tiŵe Đƌeǁs 
spent cleaning the engine rooms. An increase of beer and lager prices in the staff canteens to 
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͚appƌopƌiate leǀels͛ ǁas also deĐƌeed ;appaƌeŶtlǇ ǁithout ĐoŶsideƌiŶg the iŵpaĐt oŶ staff ŵoƌaleͿ. 
Officers and crew were given more responsibilities for maintenance and cost control. The 
Department of Trade declined permission to operate new ships with reduced deck crews, but the 
introduction of self-service allowed reducing the number of catering staff. A long list of older ships 
to be sold off was drawn up, only some of them to be replaced.
81
  
The ͚ŵoƌe effiĐieŶt aŶd eĐoŶoŵiĐal ŵaŶageŵeŶt of a sŵalleƌ fleet of aďout ϰϬ ships͛ ƌeƋuiƌed 
restructuring both sea and shore staff within OFL, which was undertaken at a series of board 
meetings in February 1978. It was expected that Second Officer numbers would likely be 
sufficiently reduced through natural wastage, these officers typically being at a stage in their 
career where they would consider starting a family and settling down in a shore-based job. 
Masters and Chief Engineers would have to be made redundant in substantial numbers, and it was 
difficult for them to find adequate employment elsewhere.
82
 While still hoping to acquire a major 
TP“M ĐoŶtƌaĐt that ͚ǁould ĐhaŶge the situatioŶ ĐoŵpletelǇ͛, OFL deĐided to opeŶlǇ laǇ these 
difficulties and the need for redundancies before staff, emphasising the promotion opportunities 
that would open up if Masters and Chief Engineers were retired.
83
 After several years of 
hesitation, a substantial reduction in fleet size and staff numbers was now implemented, with the 
aim of making all necessary adjustments during 1978.
84
  
This included the decision to no longer hold on to surplus staff as a reserve in case a TPSM 
contract could be acquired. Whereas previously OFL had sought TPSM contracts to avoid costly 
redundancies, the thinking now was that redundancies would free OFL from the need to tender 
for unattractive TPSM business.
85
 It ǁas Ŷoǁ aƌgued that usiŶg TP“M as a tool ͚to ŵaiŶtaiŶ 
eŵploǇŵeŶt͛ oŶlǇ pƌoduĐed a ͚douďtful ďeŶefit if it ŵeaŶt that iŶ the loŶg ƌuŶ it had to ďe 
abandoned and seafarers made redundant in a worse market at a worse tiŵe͛.86 
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Oǀeƌall, ϭϵϳϴ ǁas ͚a deep disappoiŶtŵeŶt͛ aŶd a tuƌŶiŶg poiŶt iŶ the deǀelopŵeŶt of OĐeaŶ as a 
shipping company. While non-ŵaƌiŶe pƌofits ǁeƌe deĐeŶt aŶd diǀeƌsifiĐatioŶ ǁas ͚ďegiŶŶiŶg to 
paǇ off͛, the ďulk tƌades ǁeƌe iŶ ĐoŶtiŶued Đƌisis aŶd the liŶer trades were hit hard by a falling 
market, congestion in the ports of oil-producing countries and fierce competition.
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 When Ocean 
ĐhaiƌŵaŶ LiŶdsaǇ AleǆaŶdeƌ addƌessed OFL͛s ďoaƌd iŶ Noǀeŵďeƌ ϭϵϳϴ, he ĐoŶĐluded that the 
͚past Ǉeaƌ had ďeeŶ a ghastlǇ Ǉeaƌ foƌ OFL ďoth ashoƌe aŶd afloat͛. Fƌoŵ oǀeƌ ϵϬ ships iŶ ϭϵϳϬ, at 
the dawn of the container age, the fleet had shrunk to a little over 40. A few months later, it 
would be down to 37, losing 23 cargo liners in a little over a year. Promotion opportunities were 
blocked throughout the ranks, and further redundancies unavoidable. The baseline assumption 
ǁas Ŷoǁ ͚that theƌe ǁould ďe a doǁŶtuƌŶ ƌatheƌ thaŶ aŶ iŶĐƌease iŶ the Ŷuŵďeƌ of ships ǁhiĐh 
ǁould pƌeĐlude holdiŶg additioŶal offiĐeƌs.͛ ChiŶese ĐƌeǁiŶg ǁas aďaŶdoned, and with falling 
numbers of sea staff, shore staff had to be reduced as well.
88
 The Dutch subsidiary NSMO was 
Đlosed as the ͚ĐoŶsideƌaďle eǆtƌa Đost of DutĐh ŵaŶŶiŶg … Đould Ŷo loŶgeƌ ďe justified͛. This 
reduction in marine activity required reviewing the Gƌoup stƌuĐtuƌe ͚ďeĐause the eǆisteŶĐe of fouƌ 
separate marine divisions, appropriate though this was for a fleet of up to 100 ships, in a period of 
ƌapidlǇ eǆpaŶdiŶg ǁoƌld tƌade aŶd ŵaƌiŶe oppoƌtuŶitǇ, Đould Ŷo loŶgeƌ ďe justified.͛ BǇ ϭϵϳϵ, OFL, 
OLL and OTL were no more and all shipping activities had been merged into a single Marine 
Division covering fleet management, procurement, and commercial operation of deep sea ships. 
During 1978, 800 seafarers and 120 shore staff were made redundant, at a cost of £8m (£3m more 
thaŶ ďudgeted foƌ at the ďegiŶŶiŶg of the ǇeaƌͿ. The ĐhaiƌŵaŶ Ŷoted: ͚It ǁas a ďitteƌ aŶd deeplǇ 
ƌegƌettaďle eǆpeƌieŶĐe͛ aŶd aŶ aĐtioŶ ͚so foƌeigŶ to ouƌ tƌaditioŶ͛. But it ǁas also hoped that ͚the 
ǁoƌst ŵaǇ ďe oǀeƌ͛.89 
It was not. Although the new Marine Division performed well in terms of improved coordination 
and decreased overhead costs, the industry remained in a seemingly permanent crisis. The 1981 
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AŶŶual ‘epoƌt Ŷoted: ͚We haǀe sliŵŵed ouƌ Ŷuŵďeƌs ĐoŶsideƌaďlǇ eǀeƌǇ Ǉeaƌ siŶĐe ϭϵϳϳ͛. 
OĐeaŶ͛s Đadet tƌaiŶiŶg estaďlishŵeŶt, Ŷoǁ faƌ too laƌge foƌ the ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶts, ǁas 
loaned to Liverpool City Council.
90
 1981 was the last year when shipping, largely container 
shippiŶg, pƌoǀided a suďstaŶtial paƌt of OĐeaŶ͛s pƌofits ďut ďǇ that time Ocean already had begun 
ǁithdƌaǁiŶg fƌoŵ its iŶǀolǀeŵeŶt iŶ the ŵaŶageŵeŶt of OCL͛s ĐoŶtaiŶeƌ ships aŶd fuƌtheƌ 
ƌeduĐed its fleet, seekiŶg to ͚aĐtiǀelǇ ĐoŶtiŶue … ƌeoƌieŶtatioŶ͛ aǁaǇ fƌoŵ shippiŶg.91 The 1984 
ƌepoƌt desĐƌiďes OĐeaŶ as aŶ ͚iŶteƌŶatioŶal Group providing industrial services to major 
oƌgaŶisatioŶs͛ aŶd its stƌategǇ as ͚to ĐoŶĐeŶtƌate oŶ the deǀelopŵeŶt of the Gƌoup͛s ŶoŶ-marine 
aĐtiǀities͛. IŶ ϭϵϴϲ, a ͚Ǉeaƌ of suĐĐessful tƌaŶsfoƌŵatioŶ͛, OĐeaŶ sold its stake iŶ OCL at a 
substantial profit and invested in further expansion in land services markets and marine services, 
ceasing to be a liner shipping company.
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5.  Analysis 
OĐeaŶ saǁ itself as ͚people ďusiŶess͛ aŶd as suĐh Ŷeeded to plaĐe the ŵaŶageŵeŶt of its huŵaŶ 
resources at the centre of its strategy. It was impossible to operate ships without qualified 
seafaƌeƌs aŶd shoƌe staff, aŶd OĐeaŶ͛s Đultuƌe aŶd ďusiŶess ŵodel as a liŶeƌ shippiŶg ĐoŵpaŶǇ at 
the top end of the market were based on well-trained staff providing a high-quality service rather 
than operating as cheaply as possible and accepting the risk of accidents, breakdowns and delays. 
There were periodic severe shortages of seafarers in the UK and while Ocean could to some extent 
hire ratings abroad this was not possible for officers, nor for experienced shipping managers. But, 
while human resources were essential, there was a danger of HR concerns determining rather 
thaŶ seƌǀiŶg Gƌoup stƌategǇ. BCG͛s ĐoŶsultaŶts had ǁaƌŶed iŶ ϭϵϳϮ agaiŶst OFL, the staff aŶd 
ŵaiŶteŶaŶĐe aƌŵ of OĐeaŶ, ͚ďeĐoŵiŶg the tail that ǁags the dog͛.93 OFL͛s ǁeight ǁithiŶ the 
company structure that was then being developed was therefore reduced. Nonetheless, in the 
mid-1970s Ocean seemed to give priority to the management of staff numbers and staff morale 
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over other strategic concerns.
94
 While Ocean withdrew from activities that involved a high 
proportion of unionised manual labour, it held on to its officer workforce and to the ships they 
manned, unable to decide about the future of its shipping activities. The decline of traditional liner 
shipping left Ocean with surplus staff operating outdated ships at a loss, despite the efforts that 
had been made to re-focus the business away from liners in particular and the shipping industry in 
geŶeƌal. The ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s eǆeĐutiǀes eǀeŶtuallǇ ƌealised that theiƌ atteŵpts to ͚pƌoteĐt eŵploǇŵeŶt 
had left the Gƌoup iŶ a ǁoƌse positioŶ aŶd ǁith feǁeƌ optioŶs to aĐhieǀe that oďjeĐtiǀe͛; 
maintaining employment through short-teƌŵ eǆpedieŶts had led to ͚seafaƌeƌs [ďeiŶg] ŵade 
redundant in a woƌse ŵaƌket at a ǁoƌse tiŵe͛. Both the ĐoŵpaŶǇ aŶd its seafaƌeƌs seeŵed ǁoƌse 
off than would have been the case had more drastic and more speedy action been taken.
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 This 
ĐoŶtƌasts ǁith OĐeaŶ͛s Đoŵpetitoƌ Hapag-Lloyd who had nearly 100 conventional cargo liners in 
1970 (i.e., slightly more than Ocean) but reduced that number much more decisively once they 
started operating container ships and were down to 33 ships already by 1974.
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 It should be noted 
though that Hapag-Lloyd were much less successful in diversifying their activities than in reducing 
ship numbers and that as a business rather than as a shipping line, Ocean appear to have been 
more successful in these years than the German company.
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 OĐeaŶ͛s peƌfoƌŵaŶĐe also Đoŵpaƌes 
favourably with that of other UK shipping firms – Furness Withy, for example, was taken over by 
Hong Kong shipping entrepreneur C.Y Tung in 1980, and P&O encountered similar problems to 
Ocean in its attempt to diversify away from shipping.
98
  
What ǁeƌe the ƌeasoŶs foƌ OĐeaŶ͛s hesitatioŶs? Maƌshall Meek, OĐeaŶ͛s Đhief Ŷaǀal aƌĐhiteĐt, 
aƌgues that tǁo ƌeasoŶs eǆplaiŶ ǁhǇ ͚the fiƌŵ teǆt-ďook ďusiŶesslike aĐtioŶ͛ of ĐlosiŶg OĐeaŶ͛s 
shippiŶg aĐtiǀities aŶd iŶǀestiŶg iŶ diffeƌeŶt liŶes of ďusiŶess ǁas Ŷot puƌsued: ͚the deĐeŶĐǇ of a 
management still teŶdiŶg toǁaƌds pateƌŶalisŵ͛ aŶd theiƌ ͚laĐk of ĐoŶfideŶĐe aŶd eǆpeƌtise͛.99 
CeƌtaiŶlǇ, OĐeaŶ͛s ǁish to ďe ;aŶd Ŷot just to ďe seeŶ asͿ a ͚ƌespoŶsiďle eŵploǇeƌ͛ plaǇed aŶ 
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important role in the decision to repeatedly delay redundancies. It also influenced the earlier 
decision in favour of a slow and gradual run-down of traditional liner shipping, accompanied by 
redeployment of sea and ship management staff into other sectors of shipping.
100
 Again, Ocean 
were by no means unique in adopting such a course which was also, for example, pursed by large 
multinational trading companies such as United Africa Company.
101
  
It is not easy to determine the extent to which it would have been possible or desirable under the 
ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes of the tiŵe to Đlose OĐeaŶ͛s shipping activities earlier.102 IŶ ϭϵϳϭ/ϳϮ, OĐeaŶ͛s 
younger executives were in favour of quicker and more radical diversification away from shipping 
than proposed by Boston Consulting Group.
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 UŶtil the seĐoŶd half of the deĐade at least, BCG͛s 
position seemed vindicated as liner shipping and liner shipping profits held up much better than 
had ďeeŶ eǆpeĐted ǁhile OĐeaŶ͛s Ŷeǁ ͚deǀelopŵeŶt ďusiŶesses͛ ǁeƌe sloǁ to ŵake a pƌofit aŶd 
the new bulk shipping activities were struggling.
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 OpeƌatiŶg ships had ďeeŶ OĐeaŶ͛s keǇ aĐtiǀitǇ 
and most obvious strength for over a hundred years. In terms of profits and quality of service, 
Ocean outperformed its competitors, turning a profit even in very difficult times and in difficult 
markets through constant technological and operational improvement. Even if shipping 
represented a dead end, a sudden change of direction would have meant abandoning activities 
that were still profitable. Diversifying within shipping ƌepƌeseŶted a ǁaǇ to eǆploit OĐeaŶ͛s 
existing strengths, whereas diversification into other sectors would have led Ocean into areas 
where it had little expertise. When the move into bulk and LNG shipping was begun in the late 
1960s, these were growth sectors. Predicting the decline they would experience within a few 
years would have required an ability to foresee the 1973 oil crisis and the expansion of 
shipbuilding subsidies which led to severe overcapacity in a contracting market.
105
  
Overall, the development of shipping markets was difficult to read amidst uncertainties and wild 
swings.
106
 However, unless Ocean was prepared to definitely forgo any plans for future expansion 
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iŶ shippiŶg it had to haŶg oŶ to its offiĐeƌ ǁoƌkfoƌĐe. If ͚laĐk of ĐoŶfideŶĐe aŶd eǆpeƌtise͛ plaǇed a 
role here, the mid-1970s was not a time when it was easy for business leaders to be confident and 
examples of businesses demonstrating more expertise hardly abound. On the other hand, a 
company more experienced in bulk shipping than Ocean with their background in liners would 
have had a greater sense for the cyclical nature of that business and seen the readiness of banks 
to finance shipbuilding on the security of a mere mortgage on the ship, rather a charter and thus 
guaranteed income,
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 as a sign that the market was overheating. The disastrous decision to invest 
heavily into LNG carriers was based not just on an inaccurate forecast but on a straightforward 
error in calculating probabilities.
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 Many strategy documents express unease about a lack of 
decisive action, while betraying uncertainty about the direction to take.  
The key issue was whether to envisage complete withdrawal from shipping. Over time it became 
clear that the policy of keeping options open and accepting at most a gradual run-down was 
inherently problematic. It led to reduced promotion opportunities and declining morale and 
eŶĐouƌaged the ďest juŶioƌ staff to leaǀe. A lot of OĐeaŶ͛s Đapital ƌeŵaiŶed tied up iŶ ƌapidlǇ 
depreciating and barely profitable shipping assets.
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 Hence the increasingly desperate search for 
new opportunities to expand, or to be able to pretend that renewed expansion was just around 
the corner.  
Fƌoŵ a histoƌiaŶ͛s peƌspeĐtiǀe it is less iŵpoƌtaŶt to judge ǁhetheƌ OĐeaŶ͛s eǆeĐutiǀes took 
͚ĐoƌƌeĐt͛ deĐisioŶs than to understand why and under which real or perceived constraints they 
acted. In this context, it will be necessary to consider the outlook as well as the self-interest of 
managers and executives. Board level discussions give the impression that finding something to do 
for managers often was a reason for hanging on to lacklustre businesses. When the choice 
ďetǁeeŶ eǆpaŶsioŶ aŶd ĐoŶtƌaĐtioŶ Đaŵe up, it ǁas ŶatuƌallǇ pƌefeƌƌed to ͚ƌaise the leǀel of 
Gƌoup aĐtiǀitǇ͛ aŶd ͚utilise the ĐapaĐitǇ of ouƌ ŵaŶageŵeŶt stƌuĐtuƌe͛ ƌatheƌ thaŶ ͚ĐoŶtƌaĐt the 
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ŵaŶageŵeŶt stƌuĐtuƌe to ŵatĐh the leǀel of Gƌoup aĐtiǀitǇ.͛110 Even the earliest attempts at 
dƌaǁiŶg up a Gƌoup stƌategiĐ plaŶ staƌted ǁith the assuŵptioŶ that ͚ouƌ eǆĐeptioŶal ship 
ŵaŶageŵeŶt teaŵ͛ ǁas oŶe of the ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s keǇ ƌesouƌĐes ǁhiĐh justified keepiŶg the Ŷuŵďeƌ 
of ships ͚as high as is Đoŵpatiďle ǁith satisfaĐtoƌǇ pƌofitaďilitǇ iŶ oƌdeƌ to ŵake use͛ of that 
resource.
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 When OLL, OFL and OTL were merged into a single Marine Division in 1979, this 
meant the loss of diƌeĐtoƌs͛ aŶd seŶioƌ ŵaŶageƌs͛ positioŶs aŶd of pƌoŵotioŶ oppoƌtuŶities. It is 
natural to assume that directors and managers were not keen on closing down activities on which 
their own jobs, and those of the teams they led, depended, and this will at least have provided an 
additional support for paternalist sentiments. At the same time, there is little doubt about the 
geŶuiŶe pateƌŶalisŵ of OĐeaŶ͛s loŶg-standing directors, including chairman Lindsay Alexander. 
They were committed to the project of modernising their company but also to upholding a 
century-long tradition of paternalistic care for highly valued employees and to their city of 
Liǀeƌpool. As suĐh, ŵost of theŵ ǁeƌe tƌaŶsitioŶal figuƌes ƌatheƌ thaŶ the ͚Ŷeǁ ŵeŶ͛ MiĐhael 
Miller sees driving the ĐoŶtaiŶeƌ ƌeǀolutioŶ. AleǆaŶdeƌ͛s suĐĐessoƌ W.M. MeŶzies-Wilson whose 
ďaĐkgƌouŶd ǁas iŶ steel aŶd ǁho desĐƌiďed hiŵself as ͚Ŷot a ǁildlǇ eŶthusiastiĐ shippiŶg Đhap͛ 
completed the cultural shift from Liverpool-based shipping firm to business enterprise.
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 OĐeaŶ͛s 
shareholders, likewise, were not free-ǁheeliŶg gloďal iŶǀestoƌs ďut ŵeŵďeƌs of Liǀeƌpool͛s 
ďusiŶess elite ǁho shaƌed the outlook of OĐeaŶ͛s diƌeĐtoƌs.113  
While OĐeaŶ͛s diffiĐulties iŶ ŵaŶagiŶg staff Ŷuŵďeƌs aŶd ŵoƌale at a tiŵe ǁheŶ gloďalisatioŶ – 
partly driven forward by Ocean itself – was disrupting its business are instructive from the point of 
ǀieǁ of that iŶdiǀidual ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s stƌategǇ, it is iŵpoƌtaŶt to stƌess that suĐh stƌategǇ is Ŷeǀeƌ 
developed in a vacuum. The wider context is important in eǆplaiŶiŶg ǁhǇ ͚teǆtďook solutioŶs͛ suĐh 
as outsourcing or rapid divestment were not taken up. The economic environment in the UK 
seǀeƌelǇ liŵited OĐeaŶ͛s optioŶs aŶd pƌoǀided ŵuĐh justifiĐatioŶ foƌ hesitatioŶ aŶd iŶaĐtioŶ. OŶ 
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aŶ opeƌatioŶal leǀel, OĐeaŶ͛s approach to functional specialisation, the division of labour and 
outsourcing seems to have been governed more by a desire to disengage from toxic industrial 
relations in occupations involving UK manual labour than by theories about optimal enterprise 
struĐtuƌe. ‘eduŶdaŶĐies ǁeƌe eǆpeŶsiǀe, paƌtlǇ ďeĐause of OĐeaŶ͛s ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt to offeƌiŶg 
geŶeƌous teƌŵs. OĐeaŶ͛s ƌeduŶdaŶĐǇ paǇŵeŶts iŶ ϭϵϳϴ ƌaŶ to £ϴŵ, that is oŶe-sixth of the 
ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s ǁage ďill oƌ ŶeaƌlǇ as ŵuĐh as pƌe-tax Group profits that year.114 The redundancy costs 
involved in a swift exit from shipping would have been prohibitive.
115
 
On a strategic level, alternative opportunities to invest were difficult to find. While rejecting 
withdrawal from the UK, Ocean did not want to expand activities in its home country which it now 
Đlassified as ͚loǁ gƌoǁth / ŵediuŵ ƌisk͛ aŶd ͚hostile to ǁealth ĐƌeatioŶ͛. IŶstead, gƌoǁth ǁas to ďe 
sought iŶ ĐoŶtiŶeŶtal Euƌope ;͚ŵediuŵ gƌoǁth / loǁ ƌisk͛Ϳ aŶd iŶ soŵe deǀelopiŶg ĐouŶtƌies ;͚high 
gƌoǁth / high ƌisk͛Ϳ. Hoǁeǀeƌ, investment outside the UK risked a negative reaction from 
employees, the government and shareholders. Bank of England approval was required for 
transferring capital out of the country, and unlikely to be given. Ocean assumed that capital for 
projects abroad would have to be raised abroad and any loans serviced out of local cash flow.
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Holding capital outside the UK required ruses – OĐeaŶ͛s DutĐh suďsidiaƌǇ N“MO ǁas kept opeŶ 
uŶtil ϭϵϳϴ pƌiŵaƌilǇ ďeĐause it helped OĐeaŶ to ͚keep ǁhat ŵoŶeǇ it ĐaŶ out of the U.K. for 
eǆĐhaŶge ǀalue ƌeasoŶs͛ ;i.e. as a protection against inflation and devaluation). Ocean were aware 
that the BaŶk of EŶglaŶd kept ͚a Đlose eǇe oŶ the Gƌoup͛s oǀeƌseas fuŶds aŶd histoƌiĐallǇ Đoŵpel 
us to bring back to the U.K. those which are deemed to ďe suƌplus͛. Theƌefoƌe, OĐeaŶ sought to 
ŵaiŶtaiŶ ͚the leǀel of shippiŶg opeƌatioŶs iŶ HollaŶd ƌeƋuiƌed to sustaiŶ͛ holdiŶg laƌge suŵs of 
money there.
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 Redistributing capital to shareholders or employees or winding down the business 
altogether was also difficult, with dividends and salary increases capped by law. 
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6.  Conclusion 
For Ocean, there was no simple, theoretically correct solution to the question of how to determine 
and maintain appropriate staff numbers, because of powerful political and other constraints and 
because of immense uncertainty at a time of overlapping structural and cyclical disruption. In the 
context of labour militancy and increasing regulation of labour and of capital transfers it was 
diffiĐult to ƌuŶ a ͚people ďusiŶess͛. OĐeaŶ ǁas led to adopt stƌategies that ǁeƌe Ŷot ͚iŶ the 
teǆtďook͛ aŶd ǁould Ŷot haǀe ďeeŶ used ďǇ ďusiŶesses oŶ the CoŶtiŶeŶt ǁhiĐh faĐed diffeƌeŶt 
contexts and constraints. As the management literature of the 1970s acknowledged, manpower 
planning had to take into account a vast array of internal and environmental, material and 
iŵŵateƌial faĐtoƌs aŶd Đould oŶlǇ ƌesult iŶ aŶ assessŵeŶt of likelǇ outĐoŵes aŶd ͚tƌouďle spots͛, 
not firm forecasts.
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 IŶ a ǁideƌ peƌspeĐtiǀe, OĐeaŶ͛s histoƌǇ illustƌates hoǁ, iŶ MiĐhael Milleƌ͛s 
ǁoƌds, tƌaŶsfoƌŵatioŶs that ͚ǁould suďseƋueŶtlǇ eƌase EuƌopeaŶ shippiŶg supeƌioƌitǇ aŶd dƌiǀe 
ŵaŶǇ fƌoŵ the sea͛ ǁeƌe paƌtlǇ dƌiǀeŶ fƌoŵ ǁithiŶ EuƌopeaŶ shippiŶg ĐoŵpaŶies theŵselǀes.119 
These companies were neither passive victims of globalisation and structural change, nor in 
control of them. The impact and rhythm of such transformations were not easy to foresee and to 
figuƌe iŶto Đoƌpoƌate stƌategǇ, ďut ultiŵatelǇ, ͚people ďusiŶess͛ oƌ Ŷot, OĐeaŶ had to adapt its 
human resources strategy to its overall strategy for survival in a changing environment. 
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